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Abstract:
How do people value freedom of choice? Drawing on economics and psychology
the paper provides an hypothesis and empirical evidence on how individuals may
value freedom of choice and derive utility from it. It is argued that the degree of
perceived control that individuals have over choice - a construct known as the locus
of control in psychology - regulates how we value freedom of choice. People who
believe that the outcome of their actions depends on internal factors such as effort
and skills (the ‘internals’) have a greater appreciation of freedom of choice than
people who believe that the outcome of their actions depends on external factors
such as fate or destiny (the ‘externals’). We find some evidence in support of this
hypothesis using a combination of all rounds of the World and European Values
Surveys. A variable that measures freedom of choice and the locus of control is
found to predict life satisfaction better than any other known factor such as health,
employment, income, marriage or religion, across countries and within countries.
We show that this variable is not a proxy of happiness and measures well both
freedom of choice and the locus of control. ‘Internals’ are found to appreciate
freedom of choice more than ‘externals’ and to be happier. These findings have
important implications for individual utility, social welfare and public policies.
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Happiness, Freedom and Control
1 Introduction
That people are in constant quest of happiness is not a novelty of our times. As
noted repeatedly by happiness researchers, Greek and Roman philosophers since
Aristotle have been concerned about the causes of happiness although progress in
this field has been hard to come. Seneca in his opening statement of the De Vita
Beata writes to his brother: “Brother Gallio, all want to be happy, but when it
comes to see clearly what makes life happy they are shadowed by obscurity”.1
What distinguishes modern from ancient times in this respect is that we have
begun to have some empirical evidence about what may determine happiness. The
last four decades have provided a stream of contributions to happiness research in
several disciplines such as psychology, sociology and economics that significantly
changed the way we understand happiness. We are starting to lift the “shadow
of obscurity” by finding elements that seem to explain well fluctuations in self-
perceived happiness.
Drawing on economics and psychology, the paper follows this recent tradition
by focusing on one possible predictor of happiness: Freedom of choice. It is gen-
erally accepted that freedom of choice increases happiness but it is unclear how
more freedom of choice turns into more happiness. In this paper, we hypothesize
that the appreciation of freedom of choice depends on one aspect of personality
known as the locus of control. We argue that people who believe that the outcome
of their actions depends on internal factors such as effort and skills (the internals)
have a greater appreciation of freedom of choice than people who believe that the
1“Vivere, Gallio frater, omnes beate volunt, sed ad pervidendum quid sit quod beatam vitam
efficiat caligant.” Seneca (1996, p. 32).
1
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outcome of their actions depends on external factors such as fate or destiny (the
externals). If this is the case, we should find that a measure that combines free-
dom of choice with the locus of control predicts happiness better than measures
of freedom alone.
An empirical investigation that covers over 260,000 individuals from 84 coun-
tries during a period of 25 years finds evidence in support of this hypothesis. A
very strong association between life satisfaction and a variable that measures both
freedom of choice and the locus of control is found controlling for country and
individual characteristics, personal values and social attitudes. This association
is stronger and more consistent than the association between life satisfaction and
any of the other known predictors of life satisfaction in a cross-country and within
country context. Two tests show that the variable freedom and control is not a
proxy of life satisfaction and that both concepts of freedom of choice and locus
of control are captured by the variable. A third test confirms that the ‘internals’
have a greater preference for freedom of choice than the ‘externals’. These very
preliminary findings open an interesting agenda for future research on freedom and
happiness and have important implications for public policies.
We start in section two by outlining the main hypothesis of the paper building
on theory and empirics drawn from economics and psychology. Section three
reviews some of the main contributions to happiness research and suggests how
this paper can contribute to such literature. Section four presents data, model and
variables used and section five discusses the results. Section six provides various
tests to check on the robustness of our hypothesis. Section seven concludes by
discussing the possible implications of the findings for public policies.2
2Note that this paper will use the concepts of utility and happiness as one concept and measure
it with life satisfaction as in Easterlin (2001) or Alesina et al. (2004).
2
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2 Freedom of choice, the locus of control and
happiness
We can simply define freedom of choice as the size of an opportunity set with
mutually exclusive alternatives. The larger is the set of alternatives (choices) the
more is freedom of choice. A restaurant menu listing ten alternatives provides
more freedom of choice than a restaurant menu listing five alternatives.
The appreciation of freedom of choice and the utility derived from freedom
of choice may depend on individual preferences. Some people may appreciate
freedom of choice more than others. Mary may be happier with ten choices on a
restaurant menu while John may be happier with five choices. We can list at least
four possible views on how people may appreciate freedom of choice:
1) One view is that the size of the choice set does not matter. What really
matters is that the choice set contains the utility maximizing solution. If the same
utility maximizing solution is found in two or more choice sets of different sizes,
these choice sets are equivalent in terms of utility. Neoclassical utility theories,
for example, focus on utility maximization and do not attribute to freedom of
choice an intrinsic value. They also tend to ignore individual heterogeneity and
assume that all individuals are equal. In such a framework, increasing the size
of the choice set matters only if the probability of capturing a utility maximizing
solution increases with size. For example, with more competitors in the market
we should expect the likelihood that prices will decrease to be higher. However,
it is also possible that increasing the choice set leads to a decreased probability of
finding an optimal solution. The voting paradox is one example. We could call
this view the heterotonic/homogeneous view where heterotonic refers to possible
outcomes in terms of utility and homogeneous refers to the characteristics of the
agents. According to this view, increasing the choice set (freedom of choice) may
3
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lead to more or less utility (heterotonic outcomes) but the impact will be the same
for all agents (homogeneous individuals).
2) A second view is that freedom of choice is always good for individuals, the
larger the choice set the better for individuals, and this is the same for all individu-
als. We can call this view the monotonic/homogeneous view. Increasing the choice
set leads invariably to more utility and this applies equally to all individuals.
3) A third view is what we could call the monotonic/heterogeneous view. In
this case, individuals are different in preferences and an increase in choice has a
different impact on individuals but this impact is always positive. Happiness is
non decreasing in choice. One example would be Sen’s capability theory where
freedom of choice contributes to define utility in a world of heterogeneous indi-
viduals. Sen (1987) and others have argued that the size of the choice set or the
degree of freedom of choice has an intrinsic value for individuals.3 Expanding the
range of possible freedoms such as political and economic freedoms should be valu-
able to individuals even if people do not vote or do not profit from the economic
possibilities offered.
4) A fourth view is that preferences for freedom of choice change across individ-
uals so that increasing the choice set may have positive or negative consequences
on utility. We can call this the heterotonic/heterogeneous view. If some people
have a taste for ease of choice rather than for freedom of choice, an increase in the
set of options may lead to reduced utility. Various explanations have been offered
for such kind of attitude. One is that enlarging the choice set leads to an increased
computational cost for individuals so that - at some point - individuals self-restrict
the choice problem to be able to take a decision (Simon 1955). Others have ar-
gued that increasing the choice set increases the likelihood of disappointment for
choosing a wrong alternative (Bell 1985) or the regret for foregone options (Bell
3See Gravel (1994) and Bavetta (2004) for critical reviews of this literature.
4
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1982). Indeed, various experiments have shown that consumers may be adverse to
excessive choice. For example, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) and Sethi-Iyengar et al.
(2004) have shown that some consumers prefer not to make a choice if the choice
set is too large.
These last explanations of why some individuals may not favour an increase
in the choice set have to do with the degree of control that individuals think they
exercise on the outcome of choices. If John believes that he cannot cope with
more than five choices in a restaurant menu and Mary believes that she can cope
with up to ten choices, six choices will result in less happiness for John and more
happiness for Mary. It is therefore important to understand how expectations in
relation to control over choice are formed. Why does John believe that he cannot
cope with six choices while Mary thinks she can?
Social and personality psychology offer one interesting concept that could help
to explain how people shape expectations about the outcome of their own choices.
This concept is known as the locus of control and was initially proposed by Rotter
(1954).
Rotter (1966, 1990) has distinguished between people who attribute the out-
comes of their actions to internal factors such as their own efforts and skills (the
‘internals’) and people who tend to attribute the outcome of their own actions to
external factors such as fate or destiny (the ‘externals’). Rotter remarked that
individuals can be ranked according to the locus of control and devised a scale
(known as the Rotter scale) to measure how close are personalities to an external
type as opposed to an internal type. The locus of control has become a very pop-
ular concept since its introduction and is now accepted in psychology as one of the
useful constructs that help to describe personalities.4
4Note that the locus of control is a very different construct from self-control. Self-control
is the ability to control the manifestation of emotions. It is generally regarded as a facet of
5
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How does the locus of control relate to freedom of choice? Our hypothesis
is that the locus of control acts as a regulator of the intrinsic value that people
attribute to freedom of choice. The ‘internals’ should attribute more importance
to freedom of choice than the ‘externals’. If I believe that fate alone is managing
my life I will not consider having an opportunity to choose among alternatives
as an asset that could improve my life. Vice-versa, if I feel in control of my life
and trust that my own choices will have an impact on my future life I will give a
greater value to freedom of choice. Thus, more freedom of choice should deliver
more happiness to internals than to externals.
We can model this hypothesis with a simple graph (Figure 1). Suppose that
we have two agents, John and Mary. John is an ‘external’ who scores low on the
Rotter’s scale of control and Mary is an ‘internal’ who scores high on the Rotter’s
scale of control. According to our hypothesis, internals have a greater appreciation
of freedom implying that Mary will derive greater happiness than John at all levels
of freedom. Both John and Mary will reach a point where more freedom will turn
into disutility rather than utility but this point will be higher for Mary as compared
to John.5
conscientiousness, one of the Big Five constructs popular in personality psychology (Goldberg
1981). The locus of control is a much earlier construct, has never really found a proper location
in the Big Five and is clearly different from self-control in that is related to the inner and self-
evaluation of individuals, not the external manifestation of emotions. There may be a relation
between self-control and the locus of control but the two constructs are clearly different. Skinner
(1996) provides a comprehensive review and taxonomy of the various constructs related to control.
5An analogy may illustrate further this point. We could think of agents as sailing boats,
freedom as the wind in the ocean, control as the size and strength of the sails and happiness
as the speed of the sailing boat. The stronger is the wind the faster the boat can go. A boat
(agent) with larger and stronger sails (control) will be able to go faster and further (happiness) but
eventually any sail will reach its breaking point, beyond which speed (happiness) will inevitably
decrease. Note that this same idea could be applied to societies rather than individuals. We may
think of societies with an internal as opposed to an external locus of control and we may think
6
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[Figure 1]
The question of personality is generally ignored in the economic discourse. In
the neoclassical decision utility framework, all individuals are considered equal in
terms of personal characteristics. In Sen’s capabilities theory individual charac-
teristics are seen as measurable characteristics such as age and education but not
as personality. Even in Kahneman’s moment based framework (Kahneman et al.
1997 and Kahneman 2000), personality is not explicitly treated.
By contrast, it is well known in psychology that personality is associated with
happiness. For example, it has been shown that pleasant and unpleasant affects
have a strong genetic basis (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996) and that optimism, self-
esteem, extraversion and neuroticism are all aspects of personality correlated with
happiness (Diener et al. 1997, Myers and Diener 1995).
It is also known that the locus of control is related to happiness. Lower order
constructs of personality that include the locus of control have been found to be
closely associated with both job satisfaction and life satisfaction (Judge et al. 1997
and Judge et al., 1998)6 and internals are consistently found to be happier than
externals (Langer 1983 and Strickland 1989). Research on the locus of control has
evidenced how an internal locus of control is associated with a variety of positive
outcomes in adults and children (Lefcourt 1982).
Moreover, according to Haworth et al. (1997), there is an established relation
between freedom of choice and leisure: “Freedom of choice in the activity being
of a freedom level where more freedom turns into anarchy and delivers social disutility rather
than social utility.
6Judge et al. (1997) proposed the concept of core evaluations, a core set of conclusions that
individuals reach about themselves. These include the locus of control as well as self-esteem,
self-efficacy and neuroticism. Judge et al. (1997) found these four core evaluations to be closely
related to job satisfaction and Judge et al. (1998) found them to be related to both job satisfaction
and life satisfaction.
7
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undertaken has been regarded as a critical regulator of what becomes leisure in
people’s minds. (...) Obtaining intrinsic rewards from engaging in freely chosen
activities has been almost unquestionably accepted by researchers (...).” (pp. 347-
348).
In substance, happiness is strongly rooted in personality and the locus of control
as well as freedom of choice seem to play a relevant role in explaining happiness.
Both freedom of choice and the locus of control have a direct impact on happiness
and the locus of control may regulate the impact of freedom of choice on happiness.
It seems natural therefore to argue that the combination of the notions of freedom
of choice and the locus of control can deliver a very powerful predictor of happiness.
The policy implications of our hypothesis are multiple. If the locus of control
plays a pivotal role in the determination of happiness and the appreciation of free-
dom of choice, then we should be concerned about the evolution of the locus of
control from childhood to adulthood and about the intergenerational transmission
of the locus of control. Can parents, teachers and governments contribute to im-
prove the likelihood of happiness in future adults by encouraging the development
of internal personalities as opposed to external personalities?
Existing research across the social sciences would suggest that this is the case.
We know from studies conducted by Heckman and various co-authors how relevant
are early childhood interventions in the cognitive and non cognitive spheres for the
development of successful adults. We also know how primary and secondary ed-
ucation build on early childhood interventions to improve individual abilities and
capabilities. “The best evidence suggests that learning begets learning. (...) Learn-
ing is a dynamic process and is most effective when it begins at a young age and
continues through to adulthood” (Heckman 2000). We have evidence that success
in the labor market is partly determined by behavioral traits and that these traits
are genetically and socially transmitted (Bowles et al. 2001a and 2001b). A few
8
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studies have also found a positive association between parents and children locus
of control suggesting that the locus of control can be transmitted across genera-
tions (see Morton 1997 for the results of an experiment and a literature review).
As discussed more in detail in Section 5 of this paper, research is attributing in-
creasingly more importance to the role of personality in explaining life outcomes
and there is increasingly more evidence that personality, beliefs and values can be
shaped through social policies and are relevant for individuals and nations alike.
3 Predicting happiness
Research on happiness over the past four decades has made tremendous progress
in identifying predictors of happiness. The World Database of Happiness,7 which
makes an effort to catalogue empirical findings, lists hundreds of variables that have
been found to be correlated with various measures of happiness. For some of these
variables, there is quasi unanimous recognition of their importance. For example,
there is a wealth of evidence and little disagreement about the fact that unem-
ployment and poor health tend to reduce happiness while marriage and religion
increase it (Wilson 1967, Veenhoven 1996, Diener et al. 1997, Clark and Oswald
1994, Blanchflower and Oswald 1997, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). It is
also generally accepted that individuals or countries with a higher income tend to
be happier on average (Blanchflower and Oswald 2000, Di Tella, MacCulloch and
Oswald 2001, Inglehart 1990, Diener et al. 1995).
More controversial is the relation between happiness and income in longitudinal
and life-cycle studies. Easterlin (1974) was one of the first to note that the increase
in GDP per capita in the United States since the 1950s had not been accompanied
7R. Veenhoven, World Database of Happiness, Correlational Findings:
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl (2007).
9
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by an increase in self-perceived happiness. This finding was confirmed by later
studies on the part of the same author (1995, 2001) and by other authors for the
USA (Diener et al. 1999) and for other countries as diverse as Japan (Veenhoven,
1993), the Philippines (Mangahas 1995), Russia (Ravallion and Lokshin 2000) and
the UK (Clark and Oswald 1994). Easterlin (2001) also noticed that income and
happiness do not move together over the life-cycle. People tend to recall that they
were worse off in the past and generally forecast that they will be better off in
the future while in fact they report the same level of happiness at diffe ent times
during their life-time.
The inconsistent relation between happiness and income in longitudinal studies
is generally explained with theories of relative deprivation or rising expectations.
Similar theories have been elaborated by psychologists, sociologists and economists
alike and seem to explain well why happiness does not increase consistently with in-
come over time. In substance, people make judgments on the relative position they
occupy within a reference group (Runciman 1966) or adjust quickly to changed
circumstances (Diener et al. 1997, Brickman et al. 1978, Brickman and Campbell
1971). Easterlin (2001) explains the finding that happiness does not seem to vary
much over the life-cycle arguing that aspirations move upwards together with in-
come during the life-cycle. This finding not only reinforces what the literature on
longitudinal studies finds about income and happiness but is also consistent with
the finding in psychological research that people are not generally good in either
remembering or forecasting feelings and that they tend to undervalue the past and
overvalue the future (Gilbert et al. 1998, Loewenstein and Schkade 1999).
A model of utility which includes the locus of control could also contribute to
explain the lack of covariance between income and happiness over time or over
the life-cycle for individuals. Income expands freedom of choice by definition and
we suggested that the appreciation of freedom of choice (the intrinsic value of
10
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freedom of choice) is partly affected by the locus of control. At very low levels of
income, more income turns into more freedom and more happiness for internals
and externals alike. But above a certain level of income and freedom, more income
and more freedom can turn into more happiness only if individuals become more
‘internals’. If the locus of control in adults who live in wealthy countries changes
very little over the working life, more income and more freedom have little effect
on happiness.
For countries and in the long run this may be very different. When countries
move from autocracies to democracies, improve their educational system and try
to empower their people they are in fact fostering the development of internals
over externals. Vice-versa, if countries are authoritarian and encourage obedience
rather than critical attitudes they tend to reward and prefer externals over in-
ternals. Countries try intentionally to shape the personality of their citizens via
public policies such as educational policies. Economic development often (but not
always) coincides with the transition from autocracy to democracy and the devel-
opment of internal over external personalities allowing more and more people to
enjoy the benefit of more freedom. However, this effect can only be observed if
a transition from autocracy to democracy is occurring, over the very long period
when generational changes occur and for countries rather for individuals. Indi-
viduals may have rather stable personalities over the life-cycle but the average
personality in a given country may change significantly across generations. We
will discuss this point in greater detail in section five at the end of the paper.
In our knowledge, research on happiness, freedom of choice and the locus of
control has only one precedent, a study by Veenhoven (2000) that focused on the
relation between freedom and happiness. The author devised two measures of
freedom, one based on the opportunity to choose and the second based on the
capability to choose. In particular, capability to choose is measured with two
11
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variables, one capturing individualistic work values and the other measuring what
the author defines as ‘perceived fate-control’, which is what social psychologists
define as the locus of control. The author finds a positive and significant correlation
between happiness and each of the components of freedom described including
perceived fate-control. The relation seems to be linear and richer nations are
shown to be happier and freer as compared to poorer nations.
The ‘perceived fate-control’ variable used by Veenhoven has been taken from
a question present in the World Values Survey.8 The question asked was: “Please
use this scale where ‘1’ means “none at all” and ‘10’ means “a great deal” to
indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way
your life turns out.” More recently, Inglehart et al. (2008) have used this same
variable as a measure of freedom of choice. In our view, the question combines
information on freedom of choice with information on the locus of control. It is
therefore the ideal instrument to start our investigation on the relation between
happiness and freedom.
8Available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Veenhoven refers to the World Values Sur-
vey 2, item 95 but this same question has been asked in all rounds of the World and European
Values Surveys.
12
Page 15 of 43
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
4 Data, model and variables
We use a large data set compiled from the European and the World values surveys.9
These surveys have been carried out since the early 1980s and question individuals
worldwide on happiness, personal values, social attitudes and individual attributes.
The version of the data set we use contains 267,870 observations on individuals
from 84 countries surveyed between 1981 and 2004 where each country has been
surveyed from a minimum of one to a maximum of four times.
The full data set contains 913 variables most of which could be used as pre-
dictors of life satisfaction. In an effort to learn from the data as much as possible
and avoid missing on important variables we first run OLS bivariate regressions
between life satisfaction and all the possible regressors of life satisfaction present
in the database. We then ranked variables on the basis of the R squared values.
As expected, the variables with the highest R squared were proxies of life satis-
faction such as happiness or satisfaction with income, family or job. This type of
variables occupied the top ten positions in terms of R squared in a list of over 800
variables. With one exception. This was the freedom and control variable used
9Values surveys 1981-2004, integrated questionnaire version 20060423. Data can be freely
downloaded from: http://www.jdsurvey.net. We are grateful to the Values Study Group
and World Values Survey Association for creating and making accessible the EUROPEAN
AND WORLD VALUES SURVEYS FOUR-WAVE INTEGRATED DATA FILE, 1981-2004,
(v.20060423, 2006). Aggregate File Producers: Ana´lisis Sociolo´gicos Econo´micos y Pol´ıticos
(ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Data Files Suppliers: Analisis Sociologicos Economicos y Politicos (ASEP) and JD Systems
(JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tillburg University, Tillburg, The Netherlands/Zentralarchiv fur Em-
pirische Sozialforschung (ZA), Cologne, Germany. Aggregate File Distributors: Ana´lisis So-
ciolo´gicos Econo´micos y Pol´ıticos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tillburg Uni-
versity, Tilburg, The Netherlands/Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) Cologne,
Germany.
13
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by Veenhoven (2000) and described in the previous section, which ranked in 7th
place. Subjective health and income were also very relevant in this classification
with the first variable in 15th place and the second variable in 25th place but the
real surprise of this exercise was the variable freedom and control which had an R
squared of 0.165 as compared to an R-squared for subjective health of 0.0873 and
of 0.0412 for income rank. Freedom and control seemed to explain life satisfaction
twice as well as subjective health and four times as well as income rank.
Many variables in the database were only present for some years or for some
country and the number of observations available varied significantly across vari-
ables. This made the R squared comparison across variables difficult as we com-
pared different sets of observations. Restricting the possible predictors of life
satisfaction to only those variables with at least 100,000 observations reduced the
database to about a fourth of the original number of variables. Among these vari-
ables, freedom and control ranked 3rd in terms of R squared after two proxies
of life satisfaction (happiness and satisfaction with the financial situation of the
household). Subjective health followed in 4th place and relative income in 8th
place. Restricting further the database to variables with at least 200,000 observa-
tions reduced the data set to a further half of the variables leaving approximately
100 variables. If we exclude the proxies of life satisfaction which occupied the top
two positions, the top three variables in order of importance were freedom and
control, subjective health and income rank in this order. In a bivariate context,
the variable freedom and control emerged as the best explanatory factor of life
satisfaction.
On the basis of the happiness literature discussed in the previous section and
on the basis of the bivariate exercise described above we defined the multivariate
equation as follows:
Hi = α + νFi + ρCc + βEi + γPi + δVi + τSi + i
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where H is subjective happiness; F is the variable that measures freedom of
choice and control over one own life (freedom and control for short); C is a vector
of macroeconomic country variables; E is a vector of individual entitlements such
as income and work; P is a vector of personal and family characteristics, V is a
vector of variables standing for individual values; S is a vector of variables stand-
ing for individual social attitudes; α, ν, ρ, β, γ, δ and τ are the parameters to be
estimated and ε is the error term. The subscript i stands for individuals and the
subscript c stands for countries. The regression is estimated first for the pooled
world sample and in a second stage for all countries available omitting the macroe-
conomic country variables. For all estimations, we use an ordered logit model, the
robust Huber-White sandwich estimator and regional cluster estimates.10
Subjective happiness (H) is measured with a question on life satisfaction. The
question asked is: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as
a whole these days?” Answers include a ten steps ladder where ‘1’ is equal to
“Dissatisfied” and ‘10’ is equal to “Satisfied”. This question is a rather standard
question used in happiness research and validation studies in various disciplines
have shown that answers to this question are reliable (Lepper 1998, Sandvik et al.
1993, Fordyce 1988, Inglehart 1990, Saris et al. 1996).
The variable freedom (F ) is the variable already described where the question
asked is: “Please use this scale where ‘1’ means “none at all” and ‘10’ means
“a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you
have over the way your life turns out.” From the formulation of the question we
derive that this variable captures two aspects which we said are closely related:
10Regional cluster estimates are indicated in our case for at least two reasons. One is that re-
gressing summary country measures such as GDP on individual measures such as life satisfaction
may provide bias estimates (Moulton 1986). And the second is that within regions the number of
observations is generally small and interviews may have been concentrated in restricted spatial
areas failing to capture the full within region variance.
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Freedom of choice and the locus of control. Personality being equal, two persons
who enjoy a different degree of individual freedom should provide different scores
to this question. Vice-versa, freedom of choice being equal, two persons with a
different locus of control should provide different answers. Further in the paper
we will test whether this variable captures effectively both aspects of freedom and
control.
We use two macroeconomic variables (C) to account for country economic het-
erogeneity. The first variable is GDP per capita estimated at Purchasing Power
Parity (2000 prices). This variable is extracted from the World Bank Indicators
database11 and is the only variable which is exogenous to the database used. The
second variable is the country employment rate calculated as the number of em-
ployed people divided by the working age population. This was preferred to the
unemployment rate because unemployment is used already as an individual vari-
able and because the ILO unemployment definition is not suited for informal and
developing economies which are largely represented in our database.12
Two variables were selected to capture individual economic status (E). These
are income and unemployment. Income is measured as self-positioning in a ten-
steps income scale where the income brackets have been measured in local currency
in each country. This is not self-perceived income but the positioning of individ-
uals into income brackets. In some sense, this is a more accurate indicator than
self-reported income which is known to be underreported in household surveys
11Available at www.worldbank.org.
12Where unemployment benefits are non existent and in rural areas the real poor cannot
afford to seek employment and engage themselves in survival activities. In such situations the
ILO unemployment rate is a very poor indicator of labor market status. On the other hand,
the employment rate is affected by variations in the working age population and provides no
information about the quality of employment. Both GDP and the employment rate are also
introduced in the equation in squared form.
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worldwide. That is because people are not asked to tell how much they earn but
simply to say to which income brackets they belong to. A categorical variable con-
strains the variance of the income variable as compared to a continuous variable
but this is not a great shortcoming considering that the dependent variable is cat-
egorical (also based on a ten-steps ladder) and that coefficients are estimated with
an ordered logit model. We call this variable ‘income rank’ because it measures the
income rank of individuals rather than the value of income. The unemployment
status is the self-reported unemployment status measured with a binary variable.
A set of variables measures individual attributes (P ). These are sex (1=female
and 0=males), age (continuous with the addition of age squared), a dummy for
tertiary education and marriage status (dummy where ‘1’ includes: “married” and
“living together as married”).
Personal values (V ) are taken into account with four variables. These include
the importance attributed by individuals to family, work, religion and politics. All
these variables were originally measured on a scale from one to four where one was
“Very important” and four was “Not important at all”. We created dummies for
each variable with one equal to “Very important” or “Rather important” and zero
equal to “Not very important” and “Not at all important”. Values matter for at
least two reasons. One is that they contribute to define individual personalities
as they are partly an expression of personality. And the second is that they con-
tribute to determine how much importance people give to the different attributes
they have. For example, being married or being unemployed have an impact on
life-satisfaction but we should expect these variables to have a different impact
depending on the importance that people give to family or to work.
Another set of variables captures what we call social attitudes (S). One variable
measures on a scale from one to ten how people think is justifiable to cheat on
taxes where one corresponds to “Never” and ten to “Always”. This seemed an
17
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important control for social cooperation and also an aspect which may contribute
to define personality. Another variable measures the political orientation of people
on a scale from one to ten where one corresponds to “Left” and ten corresponds
to “Right”. This variable has been used in the past and found to be an important
predictor of happiness (Alesina et al. 2004). A third variable measures the degree
of trust in institutions that people have. The surveys asked respondents to rank
from one to four the degree of trust in various types of national institutions where
one was equal to “A great deal” and four to “None at all”. We calculated the
individual average trust for the institutions of the army, police, justice, parliament,
civil service, press, private companies and trade unions and we then reversed the
score to make trust increasing in happiness. Thus, this variable ranges from one to
four but entered the equation as a continuous rather than a categorical variable.
A last variable is trust in people measured with a dummy variable where one
is “Most people can be trusted” and zero is “Can’t be too careful”. The trust
variables account for the mutual trust present in society and can be considered as
a measure of social capital as in Helliwell (2003).
5 Results
In table 1 we report the multivariate results for the life satisfaction equation esti-
mated on the world pooled sample with an ordered logit model, robust standard
errors, regional clusters and year fixed effects. The world sample for which the
specified equation could be estimated includes 75 countries, 1,119 regions and
160,405 observations. The sample is reduced vis-a`-vis the original sample given
that not all variables have a full set of observations. Selection bias can be checked
in table A1 which provides descriptive statistics for each variable and for the full
and reduced sample used in table 1. As it can be seen from the table, means and
18
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standard deviations are very close between the reduced sample and the full sample
and we should exclude that our reduced sample is significantly biased vis-a`-vis the
full sample of 84 countries.
The variable freedom and control is by far the most significant predictor of life
satisfaction. It shows the highest coefficient, the highest odds ratio, the highest
z-score and one of the lowest standard errors. For a one step increase in the one
to ten freedom and control scale, happiness is expected to change by about 36%
of a step on the one to ten happiness scale (considering the ordered log-odds scale
with the other variables held constant).
Individual economic status. Income rank has also a positive effect but with
decreasing marginal effects as rank increases. This conforms to previous results on
various income variables. Income is a powerful predictor of life satisfaction at low
levels of income but its predicting capacity decreases as income increases. Also, as
shown by previous studies, unemployment is a strong predictor of unhappiness.
Individual characteristics. Across the world sample, females seem to be happier
than males on average while increasing age decreases happiness up until a certain
age when the trend reverses. Tertiary education marginally increases happiness
and being married is a very strong predictor of happiness as it is well known in
the literature.
Individual social attitudes. In societies where people trust other people and the
national institutions people are happier while individuals who have a lax attitude
towards tax cheating seem to be more unhappy. This conforms to and reinforces
what we know about social capital and its role for happiness.
Individual values. Including a high importance attributed to family, work and
religion are all good predictors of happiness with a positive sign. Religion in
particular seems to be the strongest predictor of happiness among the ‘values’
variables. Instead, individuals who attribute a great importance to politics seem
19
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to be less happy on average, although the effect is rather weak. These are all
results consistent with previous literature.
Country economic status. Both GDP per capita in purchasing power parity
and the employment rate have a positive effect on life satisfaction and both with
decreasing returns. At low levels of GDP, a rise in output generates a significant
rise in life satisfaction. This effect disappears as GDP per capita reaches high
values. The effect for the employment rate is also positive at low levels of employ-
ment and diminishes for high levels. Thus, both GDP and the employment rate
can help to improve happiness in poor countries but improving happiness simply
with increases in these two measures becomes a very hard task for rich nations.
Again, these results are largely consistent with the existing literature.
[Table 1]
The pooled sample we used in table 1 took into account some aspects of the
economic country situation captured by the country variables described but could
not take into account the full country heterogeneity. Deriving lessons for individual
countries from a pooled world sample is also difficult as economic policies are still
largely made within countries. With very large samples is also easier to detect
covariances among variables but these covariances are not necessarily valid for
each country.
We decided therefore to run the same equation we used for the world pooled
sample (excluding the country economic variables) for all 75 countries considered
in Table 1. Full results cannot be shown for all countries. In Table 2A we report,
as an illustration, full results for ten representative countries.13 In Table 2B, we
13The selection of the ten countries was made on the basis of cultural diversity, population
size and geographical location. In terms of number of observations, the ten countries selected
represent over a quarter of the sample used in Table 1 and in terms of population they represent
over half of the world population.
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report only the number of times each predictor is significant across the 75 countries
and whether significant predictors take a negative or a positive sign. As before, we
use ordered logit estimations, robust standard errors, regional clusters and year
fixed effects to make results as robust as possible.
Freedom and control is the only variable that is consistently significant with
a positive sign across all ten countries in Table 2A. The coefficient and the z-
score is always very high ranging from 0.548 in Canada to 0.242 in Nigeria. We
can also observe that the coefficient of the freedom and control variable tends
to decrease as we move from developed to developing countries which is in line
with the hypothesis that the locus of control is likely to become more important
as countries develop and improve freedom. Across the full sample of 75 countries
(Table 2B) the freedom and control variable is always significant with one exception
(Turkey) and varies in size between 0.08 (Egypt) and 0.712 (New Zealand), always
with a positive sign.
In terms of cross-country consistency, age follows freedom and control with
nine countries where this variable is significant in Table 2A and 58 countries in
table 2B. With one exception, age takes always a negative sign. Age squared is
also significant in 43 countries and always with a negative sign indicating that this
variable is concave. Happiness tends to increase with age but only up to a point
when it starts to decline.
Marriage comes in third place in terms of importance with nine countries where
this variable is significant in Table 2A and 54 countries in Table 2B, always with
a positive sign. The only country in Table 2A where marriage is not significant is
India. This country is the only of the ten countries considered in Table 2A that
uses the practice of arranged marriage extensively. Despite evidence that arranged
marriages can work, it could be that - on average - non arranged marriages are more
successfull. However, India is not the only country in Table 2B where marriage is
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non significant and other factors such as the role of women in society may well be
at work.
Trust in institutions is significant and with a positive sign in seven of the ten
countries in Table 2A and in 49 of the 75 countries in Table 2B. With one exception,
the sign of this variable is always positive. Trust in people is also significant and
with a positive sign in 30 countries. In Table 2A, the countries where trust in
institutions is not significant are South-Africa, Mexico and India, three very large,
culturally diverse, democratic and developing nations. On the contrary, trust in
institutions is positive and significant in Russia and China, two countries also
very large and caught in a process of development but more autocratic and less
culturally diverse. Social capital is very relevant overall but not everywhere and
it is unclear from our data what are the factors that make social capital a good
predictor of life satisfaction.
The status of unemployed is found to be a significant predictor of happiness in
six countries in Table 2A and in 46 countries in Table 2B. Together with religion,
this is the only other variable which is significant in over 50% of the countries
considered.
The importance of religion is significant in eight countries in Table 2A and
in 39 countries in Table 2B. It is worth noting in Table 2A that the importance
of religion is not significant in China as we may expect and in Mexico which is
instead a deeply devoted Catholic country. In table 2B we also show that in three
countries the sign of this variable is significant and negative which is contrary to
what is expected. Therefore, despite the quasi universal consensus on the part of
researchers in accepting the relevance of religion for life satisfaction, we find this
variable significant in only half of the countries and not always with the expected
sign.
Income rank is significant in only two countries in Table 2A and in 31 countries
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(41.3% of the sample of countries) in Table 2B. The effect on happiness is positive
with the exception of two countries where the effect is negative. This is surprising
particularly in the light of the fact that both income and relative income have
been found in the past to be relevant in most countries studied and especially in
poor countries. The variable we used is neither income nor relative income but we
should expect income rank to show a consistent positive sign. Instead, in Table
2A, income rank is significant for only Spain and South-Africa and among the 31
countries where this variable is significant we find both rich and poor nations and
also two negative signs.
Our results indicate that countries heterogeneity is remarkable and reading in
world data or in single countries data universal findings can be very misleading.
However, this statement does not apply to the variable freedom and control which
is a remarkable stable predictor of life satisfaction in all countries. If we had to bet
on what variables best predict life satisfaction anywhere in the world our money
would certainly go on freedom and control.
[Table 2A and Table 2B]
6 Tests
We have established with a certain degree of confidence that freedom and control
is the best predictor of life satisfaction worldwide among the variables we dispose
of. In this section we want to address three questions which may challenge the
validity of our hypothesis.
1) The first question is whether freedom and control and life satisfaction are,
in fact, proxies (we call this the ‘proxies’ hypothesis). The questions asked are
different and relate to different objects but it could be that people perceive the two
questions as the same. We have already shown that psychologists found freedom of
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choice and leisure to be closely related in people’s mind (Haworth et al. 1997) and
it could be that people consciously or unconsciously reply to the two questions as
if they were answering the same question. We had this question posed on several
occasions when this paper was presented in seminars and conferences.
2) The second question is whether freedom and control is a variable that relates
only to freedom of choice or only to the locus of control or to both (we call this
the ‘double role’ hypothesis). The formulation of the question would suggest that
people considers both components when answering the question but we did not
provide evidence of that. Also, as already discussed, research in psychology has
shown how close freedom of choice and the locus of control are (Langer 1983,
Strickland 1989). It is difficult to separate freedom of choice from the locus of
control but we can check if the variable freedom and control is correlated to both
sentiments or to just one of the two.
We address these two questions with the estimations proposed in table 3. This
time we regressed the same set of variables on life satisfaction and on freedom
and control separately. We tested the ‘proxies’ and ‘double role’ hypotheses as
follows. First, among the variables already used, we picked two variables that we
expected to have a positive impact on life satisfaction but a negative effect on
freedom. These are ‘being married’ and the ‘importance of religion’. We know the
institutions of marriage and religion to enhance happiness but we also expected
these two institutions to limit freedom of choice.
Second, we picked two other variables which could be considered as correlates of
the locus of control but with opposite signs. These are the importance attributed to
child obedience and the importance attributed to child independence. We expected
child obedience to be a feature that would be most appreciated by the externals,
those who think that what happens to them depends on factors outside their
control, and child independence to be a feature most appreciated by the internals,
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those who think that they can determine their own future. We expected these
two variables to have opposite signs within each equation and between the two
equations. If these expectations are met, then life satisfaction and freedom cannot
be considered as proxies and the freedom variable would show to have elements of
both freedom of choice and the locus of control.
In the two equations we also added a number of controls including income
rank, income rank squared, unemployed, female, age, age squared and tertiary
education. We also included freedom as regressor in the life satisfaction equation
and life satisfaction as regressor in the freedom equation so as to remove all noise
due to other factors unrelated to our four variables of interest. Estimates were
conducted on the world pooled sample using ordered logit estimates with robust
standard errors, country and year fixed effects and regional clusters.
As shown in table 3, signs are all as expected. Being married and the impor-
tance of religion have both a positive and significant coefficient in the life satisfac-
tion equation while they have a negative and significant coefficient in the freedom
equation. Child obedience has the expected negative and significant sign in the
freedom equation while child independence has a positive and significant sign. All
coefficients in the table are significant and they all show opposite signs for the life
satisfaction and freedom equations. We conclude that life satisfaction and freedom
and control cannot be interpreted as proxies and that the variable freedom and
control is related to both aspects of freedom of choice and the locus of control.
[Table 3]
3) Next we want to check whether the hypothesis that internals have a greater
appreciation of freedom than externals is actually true (we call this the ‘freedom
lovers’ hypothesis). The locus of control is generally measured with questionnaires
aiming to capture personality traits typical of internals and externals. For exam-
ple, two popular questionnaires are Rotter’s and Duttweiler’s questionnaires which
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are extensively used in psychology (see Fischer and Corcoran 2007 for examples
of these questionnaires). Questions identical to those used in the named question-
naires are not available in the database we use and we cannot construct a precise
locus of control scale. However, some of the questions we have measure personality
traits very similar to those generally attributed to internals such as self-confidence,
positive attitudes towards responsibilities and a taste for hard work. Using these
questions, we could construct two variables able to capture internal personalities:
An ordinal scale ranging from external to internal personalities and a dummy
variable for internals.14
We also disposed of questions on the appreciation of various forms of freedom.
For example, we had questions asking to respondents whether they preferred free-
dom over equality or freedom over order or the importance attributed to individual
economic freedom and to freedom of speech.15 We could therefore check whether
internals have effectively a greater appreciation of freedom than externals by re-
gressing the dummies constructed to capture the appreciation of freedom on the
two constructed measures of internal personality.16
Results of these estimations for the pooled world sample are presented in Table
4. As expected, internals show a significantly greater appreciation of freedom as
compared to externals. Individuals who have a greater appreciation for economic
individual freedom and who have a preference for freedom over equality tend to
score high on the internal scale that we constructed (Columns 1 and 2). And indi-
viduals who have a greater appreciation of freedom over order and a greater appre-
ciation of freedom of speech tend to be internals rather than externals (columns 3
14See Table 4 for a description of these variables.
15See Table 4 for a description of these variables.
16Note that some of the questions selected were available for only two of the surveys included
into the database and that the sample used is small. Estimations cannot be considered as
representative of the full sample of 84 countries.
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and 4). All the appreciation of freedom variables constructed show a positive and
significant sign at the one percent level.
[Table 4]
7 Some implications for public policies
We have established that freedom of choice combined with the locus of control is a
very powerful predictor of life satisfaction. But does this matter for public policies
and why? We think it matters in many different respects.
Personality, or at least one of the aspects of personality - the locus of control -
seems to contribute to shape the preference attributed by individuals to freedom
of choice and this, in turn, has an impact on utility. Utility theory and modern
critiques of utility theories have largely ignored the question of personality whereas
we know from psychology and confirmed by this study that personality has a great
role in explaining choice and utility. It is not sufficient to have more choice, we
need to feel in control of these choices to be happier.
Moreover, personality seems to matter not only for individuals but also for na-
tions as if countries had personalities. Transitional economies provide a concrete
example of this phenomenon. The European and the World Values Surveys show
that transitional economies were almost invariably at the bottom of the happiness
league at the end of the 1990s and beyond. These economies went through a deep
recession during the 1990s and this may explain the low scores on happiness. How-
ever, freedom of hoice has increased in many respects and transitional economies
continued to score very low on happiness during the more recent growth phase.
Happiness levels are much lower than in other countries with a similar level of
income per capita. Opinion polls across transitional economies also indicate that
the majority of citizens still expresses a preference for the old socialist times. How-
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ever, this is true for the old generation but not for the new generation and this is
precisely what our model predicts. The old generation, trained to delegate respon-
sibilities for family and work to the state, has experienced the transition to more
freedom as a negative rather than a positive shock whereas the new generation
may be better equipped to make use of more freedom.
Several recent studies seem to come to the same conclusion. Inglehart et al.
(2008) found that countries where liberties have increased have also been coun-
tries where the perception of freedom of choice has increased, and this has been an
important factor in explaining increased happiness. In the words of these authors:
“Happiness reflects not only people’s objective experiences, but also how they eval-
uate these experiences. (...) In recent years, economic growth, democratization,
and these changing cultural strategies actually seem to have raised happiness levels
in much of the world. The evidence indicates that these factors were conducive
to happiness mainly through their common tendency to increase human freedom”
(p. 279). Transitions in preferences also require a generational shift. Alesina and
Fuchs-Schndeln (2007) found East-Germans to have different preferences in rela-
tion to the redistribution of income as compared to West-Germans (controlling
for socioeconomic factors). However, they note that this effect is the most evi-
dent among the older generations and is expected to disappear within one or two
generations determining a convergence in preferences between East and West Ger-
mans. A recent study on Central Europe (Varnum, 2008) remarks that: “Since the
collapse of communism, Central Europeans have a more internal sense of control
and make more dispositional attributions for others behavior” (p. 1). A report by
the South-African Center for International and Comparative Politics (CICP 2007)
noted that: “South Africans feel that they have much more control over their lives
than they did in 1990; especially the black population whose lives were controlled
by repressive laws under Apartheid. This may account for the previously noted rise
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in happiness” (p. 8).
The institutional setting of a nation has an important role in shaping prefer-
ences. A country that forms its educational system around values such as obe-
dience evidently produces pupils who are different from those of a country that
encourages independence and creativity. The Japanese government is struggling
to reform its educational system in the direction of encouraging more creativity
and independence of thought as opposed to obedience. On the contrary, Italy now
thinks that undiscipline and the lax educational policies that are the heritage of
the 1960s have gone too far and is now trying to reverse the trend. Governments
try actively to ‘form’ citizens with public policies and by doing so they shape per-
sonalities. This paper provided some additional evidence that these policies may
well have an impact on the future well-being of individuals.
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Figure 1 - Happiness, Freedom of Choice and the Locus of Control
Table(s)
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Coef. Std. Err. Odds Ratio Std. Err. z
Freedom and 
Control freedom and control 0.362 0.010 1.436 0.014 37.6
income rank 0.164 0.021 1.178 0.025 7.8
income rank squared -0.008 0.002 0.992 0.002 -4.8
unemployed -0.431 0.026 0.650 0.017 -16.9
female 0.052 0.011 1.053 0.011 4.9
age -0.054 0.003 0.947 0.003 -20.3
age squared 0.001 0.000 1.001 0.000 17.4
education-tertiary 0.105 0.022 1.110 0.024 4.8
married 0.292 0.018 1.339 0.024 16.4
tax cheat -0.033 0.004 0.967 0.003 -9.4
trust in people 0.127 0.021 1.135 0.023 6.2
trust in institutions 0.212 0.021 1.236 0.026 10.2
family importance 0.351 0.040 1.421 0.057 8.8
work importance 0.142 0.022 1.153 0.026 6.4
religion importance 0.302 0.023 1.353 0.031 13.3
politics importance -0.047 0.016 0.954 0.015 -3.0
gdp (000) 0.064 0.006 1.067 0.007 10.2
gdp squared (000) -0.001 0.000 0.999 0.000 -3.7
employment rate 0.016 0.006 1.016 0.006 2.9
employment rate squared 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 -3.7
Country 
Economic Status
Table 1 - Life Satisfaction Equation - Pooled World Sample (*)
(*) Ordered logit estimations with robust standard errors, regional cluster and year fixed effects. 75 countries, 1,119 regions, 
160,405 observations. The odds ratio is computed as 'e' to the power of the logistic coefficient.
Individual 
Economic Status
Individual 
Characteristics
Individual Social 
Attitudes
Individual Values
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USA Canada Germany Spain South-Africa Mexico Russia China India Nigeria Signif. (#)
Change 
sign if 
signif.?
freedom and control 0.496 0.548 0.506 0.517 0.385 0.405 0.260 0.341 0.267 0.242 10 no
(26.76)** (27.96)** (21.11)** (29.99)** (9.26)** (5.92)** (19.14)** (10.34)** (6.57)** (13.00)**
income rank -0.039 0.017 0.055 0.186 0.44 0.112 0.062 0.169 -0.029 -0.053 2 no
-0.81 -0.31 -1.15 (3.64)** (10.59)** -1.23 -0.84 -1.71 -0.21 -0.57
income rank squared 0.01 0.001 -0.002 -0.01 -0.026 -0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.016 0.02 4 yes
(2.76)** -0.16 -0.44 (2.13)* (6.85)** -0.86 -0.55 -0.09 -1.14 (2.38)*
unemployed -0.268 -0.559 -1.432 -0.586 -0.539 0.09 -0.37 0.286 -0.165 0.019 6 no
(2.08)* (3.63)** (12.69)** (7.27)** (6.72)** -0.38 (3.51)** -1.33 -1.42 -0.2
female 0.002 0.045 0.129 -0.036 0.064 0.167 -0.019 0.188 0.055 0.168 4 no
-0.03 -1.84 (2.41)* -0.94 -1.14 (2.12)* -0.21 (2.24)* -1.31 (2.72)**
age -0.026 -0.042 -0.049 -0.06 -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 -0.06 -0.005 -0.065 9 no
(2.46)* (4.28)** (6.15)** (5.55)** (6.86)** (2.82)** (3.91)** (3.82)** -0.38 (6.43)**
age squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.001 9 no
(3.07)** (5.58)** (5.92)** (5.05)** (6.30)** (2.82)** (3.41)** (4.05)** -0.25 (6.37)**
education-tertiary 0.002 -0.121 0.252 0.253 -0.14 -0.068 0.335 -0.001 0.127 0.253 6 yes
-0.02 (2.29)* (2.59)** (2.71)** (2.81)** -1.23 (4.48)** -0.02 -1.88 (5.04)**
married 0.589 0.691 0.506 0.554 0.302 0.35 0.29 0.509 0.118 0.217 9 no
(5.15)** (11.61)** (9.61)** (7.54)** (5.43)** (6.18)** (4.02)** (4.76)** -1.76 (3.19)**
tax cheat -0.058 -0.013 -0.02 -0.029 -0.022 -0.049 -0.001 -0.094 -0.029 0.014 5 no
(5.16)** -0.88 (2.11)* (2.83)** -1.42 (4.04)** -0.06 (3.63)** -1.15 -0.58
trust in people 0.156 0.054 0.427 0.082 0.193 -0.091 0.22 0.23 0.079 -0.041 4 no
-1.78 -0.56 (10.30)** -1.02 (3.00)** -1.13 (3.43)** (2.99)** -0.65 -0.91
trust in institutions 0.182 0.31 0.416 0.078 0.096 -0.018 0.418 0.337 0.127 0.241 7 no
(2.20)* (2.47)* (4.82)** (1.98)* -1.16 -0.43 (6.21)** (4.02)** -1.17 (6.04)**
family importance 0.371 0.58 0.195 0.32 0.315 0.367 0.178 0.274 -0.18 0.215 3 no
-1.42 (2.97)** -1.18 -0.96 -1.25 (3.38)** (2.18)* -1.24 -0.6 -0.43
work importance -0.222 -0.074 0.268 0.251 -0.017 0.3 0.069 0.265 -0.076 0.08 4 yes
(2.57)* -0.58 (3.22)** (2.77)** -0.17 (2.66)** -1.21 -1.76 -0.51 -0.58
religion importance 0.267 0.165 0.165 0.151 0.288 0.064 0.135 -0.119 0.343 0.668 8 no
(3.76)** (3.39)** (2.89)** (3.05)** (5.96)** -0.8 (2.29)* -1.36 (3.06)** (4.08)**
politics importance 0.091 -0.059 0.037 -0.087 -0.1 -0.11 -0.038 0.173 0.03 0.044 2 yes
-1.66 -1.15 -0.74 -1.74 (2.20)* -1.42 -0.63 (2.47)* -0.33 -0.95
Observations 4071 3104 6016 5521 6848 4344 4980 2755 5053 4321
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04
gdp/capita PPP (000, aver.) 27.532 23.777 22.611 16.984 9.719 8.086 7.506 2.825 2.045 0.868
(*) Ordered logit estimations with regional clusters and year fixed effects. z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Table 2A - Life Satisfaction Equations - Selected Countries (*)
Page 40 of 43
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Variable Tot. %
(+) (-)
freedom and control 74 0 74 98.7
age 1 57 58 77.3
married 54 0 54 72.0
trust institutions 48 1 49 65.3
unemployed 3 43 46 61.3
age squared 43 0 43 57.3
religion important in life 36 3 39 52.0
income rank 29 2 31 41.3
trust people 30 0 30 40.0
tertiary education 18 11 29 38.7
justifiable: cheating on taxes 1 27 28 37.3
family important in life 23 2 25 33.3
female 20 2 22 29.3
income rank squared 7 10 17 22.7
work important in life 11 5 16 21.3
politics important in life 4 6 10 13.3
Total countries 75 100.0
Table 2B - Life Satisfaction Country Regressions - Number and 
Sign of Significant Predictors
Sign
(*) Ordered logit estimations with regional clusters and year fixed effects. 
Variables significant at 1% or 5% 
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lifesat freedom
married 0.338 -0.137
(20.33)** (9.84)**
religion importance 0.201 -0.04
(15.26)** (2.10)*
obedience 0.071 -0.042
(5.73)** (2.86)**
independence -0.05 0.09
(4.32)** (7.79)**
freedom and control 0.319
(15.12)**
life satisfaction 0.344
(18.62)**
Observations 187198 187198
Table 3 - Life Satisfaction Vs. Freedom and Control
Ordered logit estimates with robust standard errors, country and year fixed 
effects, regional cluster and a set of controls. Controls are income rank, 
income rank squared, unemployed, female, age, age squared and tertiary 
education. Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%
Constraints 
to freedom
Important 
child qualities
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Dep. Var.:  Internal Scale (A)  Internal Scale (A) Internal Dummy (B) Internal Dummy (B)
Estimation: Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Probit Probit
freevseq (1) 0.0661***
(0.0249)
freepeople (2) 0.118***
(0.0246)
freespeech (3) 0.359***
(0.0514)
freevsorder (4) 0.113***
(0.0317)
income rank 0.0255 0.0188 -0.0467 -0.0438
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0327) (0.0281)
income rank squared 0.00450** 0.00525*** 0.00592** 0.00687***
(0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00281) (0.00247)
unemployed -0.0730 -0.0854* -0.0541 -0.0393
(0.0493) (0.0483) (0.0626) (0.0494)
female -0.233*** -0.227*** -0.235*** -0.233***
(0.0244) (0.0237) (0.0342) (0.0313)
age 0.00140 -0.000345 -0.0153** -0.0160***
(0.00516) (0.00548) (0.00651) (0.00568)
age squared -2.70e-05 -2.64e-06 0.000177** 0.000196***
(5.22e-05) (5.49e-05) (6.91e-05) (6.08e-05)
education-tertiary 0.214** 0.172** 0.381*** 0.391***
(0.0838) (0.0721) (0.0450) (0.0380)
married -0.0163 -0.0264 0.0102 0.0107
(0.0244) (0.0256) (0.0349) (0.0304)
tax cheat 0.0146*** 0.0129** -0.0536*** -0.0521***
(0.00542) (0.00527) (0.00704) (0.00651)
trust in people 0.0262 0.0227 0.0275 0.0321
(0.0197) (0.0206) (0.0432) (0.0436)
trust in institutions 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.220*** 0.245***
(0.0275) (0.0266) (0.0392) (0.0348)
family importance -0.0703 -0.0157 0.146 0.215**
(0.0751) (0.0803) (0.116) (0.105)
work importance 0.279*** 0.256*** 0.268*** 0.286***
(0.0461) (0.0497) (0.0701) (0.0554)
religion importance 0.0457** 0.0435** 0.0775* 0.0923***
(0.0219) (0.0213) (0.0400) (0.0300)
politics importance 0.222*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.222***
(0.0249) (0.0298) (0.0417) (0.0359)
Constant 0.337 0.0850
(0.245) (0.206)
Observations 37625 37000 10547 14194
(3) Dummy variable. 1=Very important; 0=Not very important or not at all important. Answers to the question of whether 
protecting freedom of speech is a national goal.
(4) Dummy variable. 1= To respect freedom for the individual; 0=To maintain order in society. Answers to the question of what 
is the most important responsibility for the government.
Table 4 - The Appreciation of Freedom and the Locus of Control
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(A) 0-8 Scale. One point is given for each of the following statements: 1) I usually count on being successfull in everything I 
do; 2) I enjoy convincing others of my opininions; 3) I serve as a model for others; 4) I am good at getting what I want; 5) I own 
many things others envy me for; 6) I like to assume responsibility; 7) I am rarely unsure about how I should behave; 8) I often 
give others advice. Zero is given if respondents did not subscribe to any of the eight statements above.
(B) Dummy variable=1 if respondents mentioned that important in a job is responsibility and the opportunity to use initiative 
and if they considered hard work to bring success (Score 1-5 on a 1-10 scale where 1=Hard work brings success and 
10=Hard work does not bring success). Dummy variable=0 if the two above mentioned job qualities were not mentioned and if 
respondents did not believe that hard work brings success (6-10 on the hard work scale above).
(1) Dummy variable. 1= Agree completely or agree somewhat and 0=Neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat or 
disagree completely with the following statement: "We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows 
more freedom for individuals to do as they wish".
(2) Dummy variable. 1= I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would 
consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hinderance; 0= Certainly 
both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, 
that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
life satisfaction 224857 6.56 2.50 160405 6.58 2.49 187198 6.51 2.51
freedom and control 212083 6.61 2.45 160405 6.71 2.41 187198 6.62 2.47
income rank 228825 4.68 2.47 160405 4.67 2.46 187198 4.63 2.45
unemployed 228825 0.07 0.26 160405 0.08 0.27 187198 0.08 0.27
female 228825 0.51 0.50 160405 0.51 0.50 187198 0.51 0.50
age 227545 41.34 16.15 160405 41.28 15.92 187198 41.27 15.98
edutert 228825 0.15 0.36 160405 0.18 0.38 187198 0.17 0.38
married 228825 0.64 0.48 160405 0.65 0.48 187198 0.65 0.48
tax cheat 211751 2.39 2.32 160405 2.40 2.32
trust in people 228825 0.28 0.45 160405 0.28 0.45
trust in institutions 222826 2.45 0.59 160405 2.44 0.58
family importance 206642 0.98 0.13 160405 0.98 0.13
work importance 205139 0.92 0.27 160405 0.93 0.26
religion importance 203450 0.65 0.48 160405 0.63 0.48 187198 0.64 0.48
politics importance 203136 0.39 0.49 160405 0.40 0.49
gdp (000) 214439 12.27 8.96 160405 12.11 9.32
employment rate 227883 58.95 13.03 160405 59.32 12.46
important child qualities: obedience 226699 0.36 0.48 187198 0.37 0.48
important child qualities: independence 226706 0.44 0.50 187198 0.46 0.50
Full sample Reduced sample (table 1) Reduced sample (table 3)
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics - Full and Reduced Samples
